








Fair-value accounting reveals Ottawa’s pension obligations to be larger and
more volatile than they appear, creating risks for plan participants and
underappreciated exposure for taxpayers.
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THE PENSION PAPERSGovernments are major employers, and usually provide defined-benefit (DB)
pension plans with full inflation indexing and generous early retirement provisions.
Hence, changes in thinking about, and accounting for, the costs of DB pension
plans have major implications for government finances. Both past tallies on
government balance sheets and current accruals on government income statements
may understate the true cost of public-sector employment in Canada, and gradual
recognition of changes in the financial status of government plans may understate
the risks they create. Fair-value approaches are exposing higher costs, risks and
funding deficits in DB plans, raising concerns about the security of their promises
for participants and the exposure they create for taxpayers.
This Backgrounder takes a closer look at the federal government’s major DB
pensions, principally the Public Service, the Canadian Forces, and the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police plans. Drawing on alternative valuations and sensitivities
provided in the Public Accounts, we calculate an accumulated deficit, or federal
debt, of $522 billion at the end of fiscal year 2008/09 using fair-value pension
accounting. That total is $58 billion higher than the $464 billion reported at the
end of fiscal year 2008/09. Many of the budget surpluses Ottawa has shown since
the beginning of the decade would have been deficits, and the latest deficit would
have been $7 billion larger.
Federal pensions as currently configured are more costly than is commonly
understood, and expose taxpayers, and potentially participants as well, to
underappreciated risks. Reducing or offsetting these costs and reducing these risks
should be key elements of a program to restore federal finances to a sustainable
position.
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A
revolution is underway in
thinking about, and accounting
for, the costs of deferred
compensation, particularly defined-
benefit (DB) pension plans. Fair-value
approaches are exposing higher costs,
risks and funding deficits in DB plans,
raising concerns about the security of
their promises for participants – and,
since the majority of DB plan parti-
cipants in Canada are government
employees, for taxpayers as well.
In principle, sponsors of DB plans should hold
assets sufficient to cover their promises to
participants. But the reporting and management of
pension-related assets and liabilities typically has not
ensured this in practice. Financial statements often
report “smoothed” values for assets that reflect, not
current market prices, but past and assumed future
prices also. More important, reported liabilities
typically discount future payments at rates higher
than those available on low-risk investments at the
valuation date. This practice makes obligations look
smaller than their true value, as measured by what it
would actually cost to buy participants out, or
offload the obligations to an insurer.
Theory and evidence – notably market swings
larger and longer than contemplated by DB-plan
designers – are undermining these practices.
“Going-concern” valuations that smooth asset
values, discount obligations at assumed rather than
market rates, and recognize adjustments over long
periods still matter in funding decisions and
financial reporting. But fair value principles –
measuring assets and liabilities at what they would
cost to buy or sell – are increasingly important in
solvency valuations, and emerging reporting
standards reflect a widespread view that they make
sense in all circumstances.
1The resulting
fluctuations on the asset side – and much more so,
the volatility and greater recognized expense of
liabilities – have revealed DB pensions as riskier and
costlier than they appeared. Participation in DB
plans is declining in the private sector as people
recognize that their promises are less secure, and
their costs to participants and sponsors greater, than
they thought.
This change in thinking about DB pensions has so
far affected Canada’s private sector more than its
public sector, where pension plans typically operate
under special legislation and rules.
2 Accounting
standards require private sponsors to report plan
obligations using yields of representative high-quality
debt instruments (usually AA corporate bond yields).
By contrast, some government plans do not appear in
financial statements at all,
3 and when they do, the
valuations often use aggressive assumptions about
future returns on investments in their discount rates
for liabilities – which, as just mentioned, makes them
look smaller than they would actually cost to
discharge on the valuations date.
As a result, the same perception of riskiness and
expense that has driven the private sector away from
DB plans has not, in general, affected public-sector
plans. The balance sheets, income statements and
funding obligations of most Canadian governments do
not reflect fair values for their pension assets and
liabilities – and arguably obscure the cost and risk these
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We thank Philippe Bergevin, Laurence Boothe, Colin Busby, Ben Dachis, Neil Record, several anonymous reviewers, and the members of the
C.D. Howe Institute Pension Papers Advisory Group, especially Steve Bonnar, Malcolm Hamilton, Terri Troy and Fred Vettese, for comments
on an earlier draft. Responsibility for the conclusions and any mistakes is ours alone.
1 The recent provincial pension reviews unanimously condemned asset smoothing in solvency valuations (ABCJEP 2008, p. 123; NSPRP 2009,
pp. 23, 46; OECP 2008, p. 62); recent federal reform proposals would prescribe market values in solvency valuations (Finance 2009). The
appropriateness of “going-concern” valuations, which permit smoothing, assumed future returns, and amortizing gains and losses resulting from
changes in assumptions over long periods, is a matter of debate. Recent private-sector bankruptcies, however, have highlighted the risks when
the going-concern assumption turns out not to be true – risks that reporting, and funding, to a fair-value standard would mitigate. 
2 Most private DB plans are governed by federal or provincial laws, such as the Federal Pension Benefit Standards Act (PBSA), which require
reserves, segregated from the operations of an employer, to back future benefits, and termination or wind-up provisions. Government plans, by
contrast, are typically subject to special legislation. Federal public-sector pension plans are statutorily exempted from legislation such as the PBSA
(s. 4(5)(a)) and have their own acts of Parliament, such as the Public Service Superannuation Act (PSSA), which contains no wind-up provisions.
3 Reporting of broader public-sector pension obligations for health, education and crown corporation workers, for example, is inconsistent across
the country. Saskatchewan’s provincial auditor has expressed reservations about omitting broader public-sector pensions from the provincial
public accounts (Saskatchewan 2009, pp. 47-48).4 Unlike its predecessor (OCA 2006), the most recent actuarial report on the PSSA (OCA 2009a) did not value the plan at the then-current
RRB yield. The lowest yield investigated in its sensitivity analysis was 2.8 percent, the average return it assumed a portfolio of RRBs would
yield over the long term: at that yield, the plan would cost 26.2 percent of pay to fund. Extrapolating from its sensitivity analysis and checking
against the previous report, however, suggests that at the RRB yield at the end of March 2008, 1.60 percent, the plan would have cost 34
percent of pay. The CF and RCMP plans were reported to cost 22.4 and 21.0 percent of pay respectively (OCA 2009b and 2009c). At a 2.8
percent average real return, the Chief Actuary costed them at 30.7 and 31.7 percent of pay. A similar extrapolation exercise suggests that, at a
real return of 1.60 percent, they would be worth about 41 percent of pay.
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plans create for their participants and for taxpayers. If
government employees knew their promises were not
fully backed, and if Canadians generally knew their
full exposure as taxpayers to government-employee
pensions, pressure might arise for change.
Governments are major employers, and their
pensions typically feature full inflation indexing
and generous early retirement provisions, so the
impact of fair-value pension accounting on the
financial statements of Canadian governments is
potentially sizeable. A recent study by the British-
North American Committee (BNAC) gave an idea
of the dimensions of the problem. Using
standardized assumptions for a large number of
government-worker plans and discounting their
obligations using yields on inflation-indexed
government bonds, the BNAC estimated that a net
pension liability for Canada’s public sector stated at
$190 billion, or 12 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP), in official documents in 2007
would instead have registered $422 billion, or 27
percent of GDP (BNAC 2009, pp. 5-6). The
Chief Actuary’s most recent valuation of the federal
Public Service Plan suggests that backing its
promises with federal real-return bonds (RRBs),
rather than a portfolio with an assumed higher
yield, would have cost, not the 18.5 percent of
annual pensionable pay reported, but about 34
percent of pensionable pay.
4 So both past tallies on
government balance sheets and current accruals on
government income statements may understate the
true cost of public-sector employment in Canada,
and gradual recognition of changes in the financial
status of government plans may understate the
risks they create.
The pages that follow take a closer look at the
federal government’s major DB pensions, principally
the Public Service (PS), the Canadian Forces (CF),
and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
plans. Drawing on alternative valuations and
sensitivities provided in the Public Accounts, we
calculate an accumulated deficit, or federal debt, of
$522 billion at the end of fiscal year 2008/09 using
fair-value pension accounting. That total is $58
billion higher than the $464 billion reported. Many
of the budget surpluses Ottawa has shown since the
beginning of the decade would have been deficits,
and the latest deficit would have been $7 billion
larger. Federal pensions as currently configured are
more costly than is commonly understood, and
expose taxpayers, and potentially participants as well,
to underappreciated risks. Reducing or offsetting
these costs and reducing these risks should be key
elements of a program to restore federal finances to a
sustainable position.
Ottawa’s Pension Plans
The federal government has many deferred compen-
sation arrangements – the DB plans just mentioned,
special schemes for members of parliament and judges,
retirement compensation accounts for senior public
servants, health benefits, and others. Some are partially
funded, others unfunded.
The largest recorded obligations in the federal
Public Accounts are for the PS, CF and RCMP
pensions. These plans pay inflation-indexed benefits
tied to an individual’s length of service and final five
years’ salary. At their inception decades ago, they
were completely unfunded. A formula using notional
contributions and a designated interest rate showed
obligations in “superannuation accounts,” but the
plans held no assets, and the reported amounts
reflected past arithmetic rather than projections of
future payments. After regular actuarial valuations
began in the 1950s, Ottawa made periodic
adjustments intended to narrow the gap between the
reported obligations and the valuations. The pension
liability in the Public Accounts, shown as part of the
federal debt, was therefore a hybrid of two different
approaches, neither based on fair-value principles. 
In 1999, the Public Sector Pension Investment Board
Act (PSPIBA) ended accruals under the previous
systems. The superannuation accounts became legacy
items, still recording payments of previously earned
C.D. Howe InstituteBackgrounder 122 | 3
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Public Accounts Fair Value
($ billions)
Assets (1) 37.8 34.4
Liabilities (2) -190.3 -232.1
Unamortized Estimation Adjustments 12.6 –
Balance -139.9 -197.7
Table 1: Federal Pension Plans Balance Sheet at 31 March 2009
Notes: (1) Includes investments and contributions receivable for past service.
(2) Fair value estimated using methodology in Box 1.
Sources: Public Accounts of Canada 2008/09, p. 2.18; authors’ calculations. 
benefits, receiving notional interest credits (a book-
keeping item rather than a cash payment) on their
outstanding balances, and recording periodic
adjustments to gradually reconcile their recorded
obligations with actuarial valuations. Benefits
accruing since the reform have been in new schemes
that include an arm’s-length fund of assets for each
federal plan, in which both employees and
government contributions are invested and managed
independently by the Public Sector Pension
Investment Board.
Since the new system came into effect in April
2000, then, the balance sheets of the PS, CF
5 and
RCMP pension plans have had both assets and
liabilities. On the asset side are entries for the funds
accumulated since the reforms. On the liability side
are the legacy superannuation accounts, plus entries
for the obligations accrued since the reforms. The
difference between the recorded assets and liabilities
is part of the federal debt. The key entries in the
Public Accounts at the end of the 2008/09 fiscal year
appear in the first column of Table 1.
A Fair-Value Approach to Ottawa’s
Pension Balance Sheet
The Public Accounts figures in the first column of
Table 1 differ in key ways from what a fair-value
approach would show. To begin with, the asset figure
is not based on the actual market value of invest-
ments at the valuation date. The fund assets are a
smoothed value, based on expected returns “whereby
the fluctuations between the market and expected
market value are averaged over a five-year period,
within a ceiling of plus or minus 10 percent of the
market value” (RGC 2009, p 2.18). This means that
deviations in investment performance relative to
expectations register with a delay. Because these
funds began accumulating less than a decade ago, the
dollar values of the resulting variances with market
value have not been very large, but they have hit the
10 percent ceiling on four occasions, including in
2008/09. The discounted contributions for past
service (a relatively small amount, at $0.6 billion) are
not affected, but the smoothed asset figure ($37.2
billion for the invested funds themselves) is 10
percent larger than estimated market value ($33.8
billion).
More important are differences on the liability
side. Ottawa’s valuation uses two discount rates. It
uses its estimate of the projected interest rates on 20-
year nominal-return federal bonds for unfunded
pension obligations arising from service before April
2000 – an approach that reflects the previous formula
for recording obligations in the superannuation
accounts. And it uses its expected return, currently
about 4.2 percent in real terms, on fund assets for
benefits earned since April 2000 (RGC 2009) – an
approach that is falling from favour as both theory and
evidence have discredited a previously widespread view
that long-term investors can count on equity
instruments yielding a sizeable premium over lower-
risk debt instruments (Laidler and Robson 2007).
5 Including the Reserve Force Pension Plan since March 2007. | 4 Backgrounder 122
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The Public Accounts of Canada value pension liabilities for the Public Service, the Canadian Forces, and the
RCMP using two different sets of discount rates: one for service prior to April 2000 in the legacy superannuation
accounts, and one for the obligations that have accrued since the 2000 reforms. A complete schedule of these
discount rates appears in the triennial actuarial reports on the pension plans for the Public Service of Canada, the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Forces.
The discount rate for obligations accrued prior to April 2000 reflects average expected long-term bond
rates and thus varies annually. We computed an effective compounded discount rate from the year of analysis to
2045. For the obligations accrued since April 2000, the public-accounts valuations assume a given real rate of
return on investments of about 4.2 percent.
To convert the liabilities discounted at those rates to liabilities discounted at the RRB rate, we used
sensitivity analysis in the Public Accounts (e.g. RGC 2009, p. 2.21). We weighted the discount rates for the
superannuation accounts and the pension funds based on their reported dollar values to get a single effective (real)
discount rate for each year. We then compared those discount rates to actual RRB yields at fiscal year-end (March
31), using the sensitivities in the Public Accounts and the difference between the discount rates and the RRB
yields to estimate the fair-value accrued pension obligations.
Our estimates of the discount rates used in the Public Accounts are contrasted with the RRB rates in the
table below. The table also shows the change in value of liabilities per percentage point of discount rate, and the
recorded and adjusted values for pension liabilities. For completeness, it also shows the recorded and market values
of assets (which includes the entry for past-service contributions in both cases), and the unamortized estimation
adjustments in the Public Accounts, which has no counterpart in the fair-value estimates.
Fair-Value Adjustments to Federal Pension Liabilities, 2000/01 to 2008/09
(billions of dollars unless otherwise indicated)
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
Assets as Reported 2.8 5.9 8.9 13.4 18.3 24.9 31.6 38.7 37.2
Assets at Fair Value 2.5 5.6 8.1 14.2 19.4 27.6 35.0 38.9 33.8
Obligations as Reported -124.0 -125.9 -134.3 -142.4 -145.3 -155.8 -168.3 -178.6 -190.3
Estimated Effective
Discount Rate Used
in Public Accounts (%) 3.52 3.54 3.47 3.49 3.52 3.31 3.34 3.37 3.15
Real Return
Bond Yield (%) 3.51 3.68 3.05 2.39 2.03 1.58 1.76 1.60 1.81
Sensitivity of Liabilities
to 1 Percentage Point
Lower Discount Rate 18.6 18.6 17.5 22.6 22.7 24.9 27.0 28.1 31.1
Obligations at 
Fair Value -124.3 -123.2 -141.7 -167.3 -179.1 -198.8 -210.9 -228.3 -232.1
Unamortized 
Estimation Adjustments -8.3 -7.3 -0.7 0.9 -3.1 -0.7 1.3 1.7 12.6
Box 1: A Fair-Value Approach to Federal Pension Liabilities – Key Methodological Points
Sources: Public Accounts of Canada; Office of the Chief Actuary; Bank of Canada; authors’ calculations.Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
Neither the pre-2000 nor the post-2000 discount
factors reflect current economic reality. To get a fair-
value estimate of Ottawa’s pension obligation, the key
question is: how large a buyout package would leave
plan participants indifferent between receiving the
package and receiving their accrued benefits? The
answer will depend on their risk and return expectations
for the investment they could fund from the package.
In our view, the best potential substitute for the
pension promise to federal employees, and therefore
the best instrument to use in valuing that promise, is
the federal government’s inflation-adjusted real return
bond (RRB). Because the obligation is backed by
taxpayers, employees will reasonably see it as no more
risky than sovereign debt, and because the pension
promise is indexed to inflation, the appropriate
instrument is tax-backed and inflation-indexed. (The
Appendix presents some potential objections to this
approach and our answers to them.)
Estimates of the sensitivity of the present value of
accrued pension obligations to the discount rate in
the federal Public Accounts (Box 1) provide a tool to
adjust the liabilities reported in the Accounts to a
fair-value figure based on the RRB rate. At the RRB
rate that prevailed at fiscal year-end, liabilities for
2008/09 would have totalled about $232 billion, as
shown in the second column of Table 1.
The final entry in the first column of Table 1,
“unamortized estimation adjustments,” is the portion
of changes in asset values and changes in liability
estimates, using the government’s methodology, that
have yet to be reflected in the income statement and
the balance sheet. This number is sometimes quite
large, as it was in 2008/09, when the drop in market
value of the assets was outside the 10 percent
corridor, and a downward adjustment in the
assumed return on investments boosted the
estimated pension obligation – a change that will be
reflected in the Public Accounts over a period of
years. The second column in Table 1 contains no
such entry, because fair-value reporting recognizes all
such changes immediately. 
The bottom line – the government’s net pension
obligation – is quite different under the two
approaches. The fair-value approach yields a net
obligation of $197.7 billion – $57.8 billion larger
than the reported figure of $139.9 billion. This is a
sizeable figure by any standard. It raises the federal
debt from the $463.7 billion shown in the Public
Accounts to $521.5 billion. From a taxpayer
perspective, the federal debt per family of four is
larger by nearly $7,000, going from less than
$55,000 to nearly $62,000. From a plan-participant
perspective, it represents assets that are some
$145,000 per contributor short of obligations.
Similar methods let us recreate Ottawa’s balance
sheet using a fair-value approach to federal pensions
for the past nine years. This approach shows Ottawa’s
net pension liabilities – and consequently its debt –
to have been smaller than was reported in the Public
Accounts in fiscal years 2000/01 and 2001/02, and
increasingly larger than reported in the Public
Accounts since then (Figure 1).
Implications of the Fair-Value Approach
for Ottawa’s Income Statement
Since the gap between reported and fair-value net
pension obligations has grown over time, the
restatement affects not just the size of the debt, but
changes in it – the annual budget balances.
6The
reported figures showed consistent surpluses until
2008/09’s roughly $6 billion deficit. During most of
this period, however, pronounced declines in the
RRB yield made a given stream of inflation-indexed
payments more valuable, and therefore made the
buyout package that would fairly compensate
participants for giving up their pensions more
expensive. Mainly for this reason, fair-value
accounting for pensions would have shown
consistently weaker results after 2001/02: smaller
surpluses in 2005/06, and 2006/07, deficits in
2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05 and 2007/08, and a
shortfall of $13.0 billion in 2008/09 – some $7
billion worse than reported (Figure 2).
7
The federal budget balance got intense scrutiny
over this period, with debates about over- and under-
predictions, and suspicion that desire to avoid
embarrassingly large surpluses was driving otherwise
Backgrounder 122 | 5
6 Since 2006/07, changes in the accumulated deficit have also included a relatively small figure for “other comprehensive income or loss.” Here,
we treat these as part of the budget balance.
7 We do not attempt a full restatement of the federal government’s revenues and expenditures: doing so would involve changing or undoing a
large number of charges and credits to compensation costs, interest payments, and recorded adjustments to pension accounts, which would

























Figure 1: Net Federal Pension Obligation, 2000/01 to 2008/09: As Reported versus Fair-Value Estimate
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Figure 2: Federal Budgetary Balance as Reported versus as Estimated using Fair Value Pension Accounting
Sources: Public Accounts; authors’ calculations as described in Box 1.Backgrounder 122 | 7
undesirable spending and tax changes.
8 It is therefore
disconcerting to see how different fair-value pension
accounting would have made Ottawa’s balance in
many of these years. 
This reconstruction assumes no change in the
government’s actual behaviour during the past
decade. But fair-value reporting for Ottawa’s
pensions might have changed federal fiscal policy. If
it had prompted fuller funding of these pensions, the
federal government would have had to issue large
additional amounts of marketable debt. The net
pension obligations shown here would have
attenuated the perception through most of this
decade that the cost of the federal government – and
the share of that cost future generations would bear –
was shrinking, which might have meant more
spending restraint and/or delayed tax reductions.
Fair-value reporting would also have added
volatility to Ottawa’s bottom line: the variability of
the federal debt around its 2000/01-to-2008/09
trend is about two-thirds higher with the restated
figures than with the reported ones.
9This, too,
might have prompted calls for fuller funding or more
fundamental reforms – such as a phased replacement
of the DB plan by DC arrangements, as has occurred
in the private sector and for provincial employees in
Saskatchewan, or by the kind of hybrid risk-sharing
arrangements that cover some employees in the
broader public-sector.
10 Governments’ annual budget
balances, debt issues and balance sheets – even their
deferred compensation component
11 – are major
topics of financial reporting, economic analysis, and
media and public debate, so it is hard to believe
Ottawa’s reporting of its net pension obligations has
no effect on its actions.
Final Observations
The movement in pension accounting toward fair-value
approaches is driven by sound logic. Smoothed asset
values and liabilities estimated on the basis of assumed
investment returns decades into the future are shaky
foundations for deferred-compensation promises, from
the perspectives of both the person making the promise
and the person to whom it is made. Only by valuing
assets and liabilities at their value in exchange can
pension-plan sponsors and participants understand the
true cost and risks of their plans.
This logic applies not just to the private sector, but
also to the public sector, where the exposure of
taxpayers – who are not direct parties to the pension
deal, but ultimately underwrite it – creates a further
imperative of accountability. Fuller knowledge of
current federal pension arrangements might leave
Canadians supportive of them. But we do not know
this, and the impact of fair-value accounting on
Ottawa’s debt and annual budget balances is so
substantial that we should find out.
Some may object that valuing pension assets and
obligations using market prices and yields will create
perceptions of cost and risk that would undermine
these plans in the public sector as they have in the
private sector. We are not sympathetic to this
argument. Experience in steel, cars, telecoms and
other mature industries has shown how understating
the cost and volatility of DB obligations can lead
plans to run accumulated deficits larger than their
sponsors can cover, leaving pensioners short and/or
taxpayers picking up the pieces. We need to get a
better handle on public-sector pensions before similar
accidents happen on a more colossal scale. Fair-value
measurement of Ottawa’s pension obligations is a key
step toward better management of them.
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8 The controversy generated one arms-length review of the federal Department of Finance’s forecasting record (O’Neill 2005), which found that
these in-year changes were material. Correlations between revenue and spending “surprises” – deviations between outcomes and budget
projections – also suggest that Ottawa, like many provinces, not only shapes its budgets to meet a bottom-line target, but changes course
throughout the year to achieve it (Busby and Robson 2009). 
9 The standard deviations around the trends are a little less than $4.9 billion in the original figures, and more than $7.9 billion in the restated ones.
10 The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan and the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System are prominent examples of plans with built-in
formulas for changing employee contributions and even benefits if assets fall badly short of obligations.
11 The revelation in September 2009 that representatives of the City of Toronto had knowingly cited an incorrectly low figure for post-retirement
benefits during a civic worker’s strike in which those benefits were a high-profile issue created a storm because of suspicion that desire to settle the
strike inspired the misrepresentation (see, for example, Kelly McParland “$200m is more than an ‘error’,” National Post, September 22, 2009).Using the RRB yield to value federal pension
obligations does not command universal support.
Some argue, for example, that the backing of these
plans by taxpayers justifies a high discount rate,
because i) the plan can invest in equities or other
assets that do not match its liabilities, and ii) it can
ride out the resulting volatility until aggressive
return assumptions are borne out, since it is
extremely unlikely to wind up without sufficient
funds in the meantime (OCA 2006). Yet the
implicit assertion that investments in these other
instruments will earn a substantial premium over
the relevant time frame, and that this premium is
sufficiently certain to book in advance, goes
beyond what the evidence supports. 
Over the 40 years to the end of 2008, for example
– a period that would essentially cover the working
life of a public servant born in 1948 – the
cumulative total return on stocks was less than the
cumulative total return on bonds (see the chart
below). The potential benefit from investing in
mismatched assets should only be recognized if
and when it arises, not in advance as if it were
guaranteed. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2008)
highlight the illogic of discounting liabilities at
high rates without adjusting for risk by showing
that if US state governments invested pension
assets in an all-equity portfolio and reported this
way, “the surplus that would appear to emerge
would justify withdrawals from public pension
funds sufficient to pay down all outstanding state
bonds and pay a $5,000 dividend to every
American citizen.” The RRB yield is a more
sensible measure of the exposure of both
participants and taxpayers. 
Another perspective favouring the RRB yield as
a discount rate is to consider deferred
compensation as being like a loan from the
employees to the government: they receive less
pay in the present, to be repaid, with interest, in
the future. It is reasonable to assume that the
default risk attached to a government’s debt is
reflective of its creditworthiness, and that its
willingness and ability to meet its pension
| 8 Backgrounder 122
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Figure A-1: Cumulative Total Real Return on a $1 Investment in 1968, Common Stocks 
and Long Canada Bonds
Notes: Common stocks returns computed from the December to December ratio of the S&P/TSX Total Return Index. Long Canada bonds returns assume
the purchase of a bond with 18 years to maturity in December, sold after one year. 
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promises is on a par with its willingness and
ability to service its funded debt.
The International Public Sector Accounting
Standards Board’s standard for post-retirement
benefits is that “the discount rate reflects the time
value of money” (IPSASB 2008, p. 34). This
approach also supports a discount rate that
approximates the government’s cost of borrowing.
True, a portfolio of RRBs is liquid, while a
government pension may be difficult to borrow
against in full. A countervailing consideration,
however, is that an owner of RRBs faces
reinvestment risk, while the employee who has
“lent” his or her compensation to the government
does not. On balance, we find the RRB yield a
more compelling benchmark than the alternatives.
A final objection to the RRB yield as a discount
factor is that it is affected by the scarcity of RRBs,
which drives up the premium investors must pay
for protection against inflation. To the extent this is
true, however, the value of inflation protection in
pensions is greater because of the lack of
alternatives. The straightforward implication of a
shortage of RRBs is that the federal government
should issue more of them. If doing so reduced
distortion in RRB yields, we would have a better
benchmark for discounting – and a better outcome
than adjusting the RRB yield up an arbitrary
amount, or abandoning it for a less defensible
discount rate. 
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